Features and intrigues of constitutional reform-2020 in Russia

Abstract

The need to reform Yeltsin’s Constitution-1993 has long been justified by Russian scientists. However, the unspoken moratorium on intrusion into the text of the Constitution has long held back the actualization of its large-scale reform. But the point changes of the Constitution on the initiative of the President were carried out: consolidation of the subjects of the Russian Federation; increase the term of the President from 4 to 6 years, State Duma — from 4 to 5 years; introduction of the Institute of the Government’s annual report to the State Duma; change the name of Chapter 7 of the Constitution and the appointment of deputy attorneys general and all prosecutors; unification of the Supreme Court of Russia and the Supreme Court of Arbitration of the Russia; et al. Announced by Vladimir Putin in a Message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation 15.01.2020 constitutional reform was unexpected. The author for the first time drew attention to the following aspects of constitutional reform-2020: 1) transit of power-2024 as the original reason for Vladimir Putin’s declaration of constitutional reform; 2) idea of the constitution of the State Council as a distraction from the main idea of the transit of power and a spare option; 3) discrepancy between official rhetoric and the true motives of the initiators; 4) strengthening the powers of the President of the Russian Federation against the background of decorative increase in the powers of the Parliament and the Constitutional Court of the RF; 5) use of the eff ect of surprise and authority of the legendary personality in promoting the idea of zeroing out the terms of the legislature of the current President of the RF; 6) intrigue around the way to legitimize constitutional reform-2020; 7) convergence of the powers of the State Council of the RF and the President of the RF in determining the main directions of the state’s domestic and foreign policy. Despite sharp criticism of some aspects of the reform by Russian constitutionalists, the author concludes that this is a sovereign matter of the country, itself Russia’s own sovereign business. The people legalized this reform by a plebiscite in the form of trust in the government and Putin. No one from abroad has the right to tell Russia and the Russian people how to live